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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby K. Fox**
and Tala Amirfazli***
I. INTRODUCTION

The 2016 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit,I several of which involved issues of first impression. This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh Circuit,
including significant rulings in the areas of statutory interpretation and
class actions.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Shield a Debt Collector From

*Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1994); Managing Editor (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
**Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 2000) (Phi Beta Kappa); Emory University School of Law (J.D.,
with honors, 2003). Member, Emory International Law Review (2001-2002); Notes and
Comments Editor (2002-2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georcum laude, 2010); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., with honors,
(B.A.,
gia
2013). Member, Georgia State Law Review (2011-2013); Legislative Editor (2012-2013).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of trial practice during the prior survey period, see John O'Shea
Sullivan, Ashby K. Fox & Tala Amirfazli, Trial Practice and Procedure, Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 67 MERCER L. REV. 975 (2016).
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Liability Under the FDCPA For Filinga Proof of Claim on a
Debt It Knows to be Time-Barred.
In Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC,2 the Eleventh Circuit resolved
an apparent tension between the Bankruptcy Code and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),3 holding that the Bankruptcy Code
provision allowing creditors to file proofs of claim for debts which appeared on their face to be time-barred did not preclude liability under the
FDCPA for debt collectors filing proofs of claim for debts they knew to be
time-barred.4
The consolidated appeal arose when two individual plaintiffs (the
Debtors) sued their respective creditors (the Creditors) under the FDCPA
after the Creditors filed proofs of claim seeking to collect on time-barred
debts in the Debtors' Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases. 5 Even though the
statutes of limitation on the debts were six years,6 the date of the last
transactions on the subject accounts for both Debtors was more than six
years before the Debtors filed for bankruptcy.7 Both Debtors alleged that
the Creditors violated the FDCPA by filing proofs of claim for debts on
which the statutes of limitation had run. 8

2. 823 F.3d 1334(11th Cir. 2016).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).
4. Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1341.
5. Id. at 1335. The plaintiff Aleida Johnson (Johnson) filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
petition in March 2014. The defendant Midland Funding, LLC (Midland) is a buyer of unpaid debts that specifically purchases "accounts with overdue unpaid balances and tries to
collect those accounts." Id. Midland's claim against Johnson originated from a loan that
Johnson obtained from Fingerhut Credit Advantage (Fingerhut). Id. The last transaction
on Johnson's account with Fingerhut was in May 2003, more than ten years before Johnson
filed for bankruptcy. Id. Similarly, the plaintiff Judy Brock (Brock and together with Johnson, Debtors) filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in April 2014. The defendant Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. (Resurgent and together with Midland, Creditors) is a "manager
and servicer of domestic and international consumer debt portfolios for credit grantors and
debt buyers." Id. Resurgent was attempting to collect Brock's debt on behalf of LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV), which is a purchaser of unpaid debt like Midland. Brock's debt originated
with Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. (WaMu), and the last transaction on Brock's account
with WaMu was in January 2008, more than six years before Brock filed her bankruptcy
petition. Id.
6. The claim originated in Alabama, where the applicable statute of limitations for a
creditor to collect an overdue debt is six years. Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (2017)).
7. Id.
8. Id. The FDCPA states that "[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt," which
"includes attempting to collect a debt that is not 'expressly authorized by the agreement
creating the debt or permitted by law."' Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f(1)). Because
the Debtors alleged that the Creditors' proofs of claim on their face were barred by the
applicable six-year statute of limitations, the Debtors argued that the proofs of claim were
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Finding an irreconcilable conflict between the provision of the Bankruptcy Code authorizing a creditor to file a proof of claim on a debt that
is time-barred, and the FDCPA which makes it unlawful for a debt collector to attempt to collect a debt known to be time-barred, the District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama dismissed both FDCPA law0
suits,9 and the two cases were consolidated on appeal.1 On appeal, the
Debtors argued that the district court's analysis conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit's prior analysis and holding in Crawford v. LVNV Funding,
LLC,11 wherein the Eleventh Circuit held that "a debt collector violates
the FDCPA by knowingly filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding on a debt that is time-barred." 12 In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit
left open the question of whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts the
3
FDCPA when creditors misbehave in bankruptcy.' Because the parties
"unfair, unconscionable, deceptive, and misleading in violation of the FDCPA." Id. at 133637.
9. Id. at 1337. In Johnson's FDCPA lawsuit, the district court granted Midland's motion to dismiss, reading the Bankruptcy Code as "affirmatively authorizing a creditor to file
a proof of claim-including one that is time-barred-if that creditor has a 'right to payment'
that has not been extinguished under applicable state law." Id. at 1337. The district court
found the conflict between this provision of the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, which
makes it unlawful to file a proof of claim known to be time-barred, to be irreconcilable, and

thus, "applied the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that a creditor's right to file a timebarred claim under the [Bankruptcy] Code precluded debtors from challenging that practice
as a violation of the FDCPA in the Chapter 13 bankruptcy context." Id. Because the district
court ruled on Brock's lawsuit after Johnson's lawsuit, the court granted Resurgent's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the rationale and holding in the Johnson case.
Id.
10. Id. at 1337.
11. 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
12. Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1337. On appeal, the Debtors argued that the Bankruptcy
Code "does not preclude this type of FDCPA claim simply because the claim was made in
the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case." Id. In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit faced
a question nearly identical to the question addressed in this appeal-"whether a proof of
claim to collect a stale debt in Chapter 13 bankruptcy violates the [FDCPA]." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1256-57).
13. Id. at 1338. In Crawford, the court "first looked to the language of the FDCPA,
which prohibits a 'false, deceptive, or misleading representation,' . . . or 'unfair or unconscionable means,' ... to collect on a debt." Id. at 1337 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e), 1692(f)).
However, "[b]ecause of the ambiguity in these terms," the court in Crawford adopted the
"least-sophisticated consumer standard" to "evaluate whether a debt collector's conduct was
deceptive under the FDCPA," and concluded that "[s]imilar to the filing of a stale lawsuit,"
which is prohibited by the FDCPA for debts on which the statute of limitations has run, "a
debt collector's filing of a time-barred proof of claim creates the misleading impression to
the debtor that the debt collector can legally enforce the debt." Id. The court in Crawford
explained that because
the least sophisticated Chapter 13 debtor may be unaware that a claim is time
barred and unenforceable and thus fail to object to such a claim, ... when the
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in Crawford did not raise the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Code displaces or preempts the FDCPA provisions making it unlawful to file a
proof of claim known to be time-barred, the district court in Crawford
artfully dodged this issue and the Eleventh Circuit in Crawford declined
to address it on appeal.14
In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit answered the question left open in
Crawford, explaining that although the Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to file proofs of claim in Chapter 13 cases on debts known to be timebarred, this provision of the Bankruptcy Code can be read together with
the FDCPA because "when a particular type of creditor-a designated
'debt collector' under the FDCPA-files a knowingly time-barred proof of
claim in a debtor's Chapter 13 bankruptcy, that debt collector will be vulnerable to a claim under the FDCPA."15
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy
Code "differ in their scopes, goals, and coverage, and can be construed
together in a way that allows them to coexist." 16 The court disagreed with

,

debtor fails to object, the time-barred debt becomes part of the debtor's repayment plan, which would necessarily reduce[] the payments to other legitimate
creditors with enforceable claims.
Id. at 1337-38. Accordingly, the court in Crawford concluded that "the practice of filing
time-barred proofs of claim was misleading under the FDCPA." Id. at 1338.
14. Id. at 1338. In Crawford, the court explained that it "decline[d] to weigh in on a
topic the district court artfully dodged: Whether the [Bankruptcy] Code 'preempts' the
FDCPA when creditors misbehave in bankruptcy." Id. The court explained that in Crawford, it '"need not address this issue' because the claimant there 'argue[d] only that its conduct does not fall under the FDCPA, or, alternatively, did not offend the FDCPA's prohibitions,' and it 'd[id] not contend that the Bankruptcy Code displaces or 'preempts' §§ 1692e
[sic] and 1692f of the FDCPA."' Id. (quoting Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262 n.7).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1340. The court explained that under the Bankruptcy Code, a "creditor ...
may file a proof of claim in a debtor's bankruptcy," and "the [Bankruptcy] Code does allow
claims in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding by a party who does not necessarily have a
right to have his claim paid." Id. at 1338. The court noted the difference between a cause of
action and an available remedy, explaining that "having a claim is not the same as being
entitled to a remedy." Id. For example, "[w]hen the statute of limitations expires, it does
not extinguish the cause of action; instead, it makes the remedy unavailable." Id. (alterations in original). The court noted that although a "proof of claim is ... generally 'deemed
allowed,"' and viewed as a valid claim to be paid out of the bankruptcy estate, a "bankruptcy
trustee is charged with examin[ing] proofs of claim and object[ing] to the allowance of any
claim that is improper." Id. at 1339 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5) (2012)) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§§ 502(a), 1302(b)(1) (2012)). Ultimately, "where the bankruptcy process is working as intended, a time-barred proof of claim may be filed but will not be paid by the bankruptcy
estate." Id.
Under the FDCPA, a debt collector cannot "use unfair or unconscionable means to collect
any debt," and may not "use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt." Id. However, as the court notes, the FDCPA
does not reach all creditors, but only applies to debt collectors, who are defined as "any
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the district court's conclusion that there was obvious tension between the
Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, and rejected the district court's application of implied repeal to support its finding that a creditor's right to file
a time-barred claim under the Bankruptcy Code precluded debtors from
17
challenging that practice as an FDCPA violation in Chapter 13 cases.
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit reconciled the statutes by holding that
the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude an FDCPA claim in Chapter 13
cases when a debt collector files a proof of claim it knows to be timebarred. 1 In so holding, the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code allows
all creditors to file proofs of claim, while the FDCPA "dictates the behav19
ior of only 'debt collectors' both within and outside of bankruptcy." Further, the court explained that in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, if
a creditor files a time-barred proof of claim, the bankruptcy trustee may
20
object to the claim, the bankruptcy court can deny payment of the claim,
and the bankruptcy court may "'issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Code],'
21
such as issuing sanctions against a party for misbehavior." In contrast,
the FDCPA "kicks in" only under certain limited circumstances and provides "an additional layer of protection against a particular kind of creditor." 22 In sum, the Eleventh Circuit found that the FDCPA and the

or
person who ... regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed
Further,
1692(a)(6)).
§
U.S.C.
15
(quoting
Id.
another."
or
due
owed
be
to
due or asserted
because "debt collectors are a narrow subset of the universe of creditors who might file
in
proofs of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. . .not all 'creditors' who file a proof of claim
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case can face potential FDCPA liability as 'debt collectors."' Id.
17. Id. at 1339-40. The court explained that based on the district court's perception
that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA,
"the District Court found that the later-enacted [Bankruptcy] Code impliedly repealed the
earlier-enacted FDCPA." Id. Disagreeing with the district court, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that "courts must be modest in construing a repeal by implication." Id. at 1340. It
stated that, "[f]or irreconcilable conflict to exist there must usually be some sort of 'positive
repugnancy' between the statutes at issue, because two statutes can typically coexist if they
simply contain'different requirements and protections."' Id. (quoting J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44 (2001) (internal citations omitted)). The
court explained that it "will not infer a statutory repeal unless either the later statute exorder
pressly contradicts the earlier statute or this construction 'is absolutely necessary' in
for the later statute to 'have any meaning at all."' Id.
18. Id. at 1338.
19. Id. at 1340 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)).
20. Id. at 1341 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5), 1302(b)(1), 502(b)(1) (2012)).
21. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).
22. Id. The court explained that the FDCPA "kicks in only when the creditor is a debt
collector that 'regularly collects' or is in 'any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection' of debts." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)). Further "the requirement for finding
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Bankruptcy Code can coexist, and that its holding that the Bankruptcy
Code does not preclude an FDCPA claim in the bankruptcy context "does
not infringe any creditor's ability to file a claim in a debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding," but instead promotes Congress's intent to protect debtors
from unfair or misleading claims by debt collectors. 23 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 11, 2006, in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson24 and subsequently reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
decision.25
B. A Foreign Defendant Cannot Be ProperlyServed With Process
By Federal Express Without PriorCourt Authorization.
In De Gazelle Group, Inc. v. Tamaz Trading Establishment,26 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion
to vacate a $2.5 million default judgment against it under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) 27 for insufficient service of process, concluding
that delivery of service of process to the defendant, a foreign corporation,
by Federal Express (FedEx) was not authorized by the Federal Rules,
and the plaintiff had not received prior court authorization to serve the
defendant using that method. 28

a violation is quite stringent-the creditor's behavior must reach the point of 'unconscionab[ility]' or 'decepti[on],"' and "[i]t is only under these circumstances that the FDCPA
offers the severe remedy of civil liability for damages to the debtor." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§
1692(e), 1692(f)).
23. Id. The court rejected the Creditors' argument that "potential consequences under
the FDCPA for filing a time-barred proof of claim effectively forces a debt collector to 'surrender[] its rights to file a proof of claim."' Id. (alterations in original). The court explained
that
[t]his argument misunderstands the relationship between the two statutes.
There is no blanket prohibition on filing a time-barred claim in bankruptcy, and
[the Court] say[s] nothing to the contrary here. In the same way, the Bankruptcy
Code does not require any creditor to file a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding-it only allows it.
Id. The court further explained that "[i]f a debt collector chooses to file a time-barred claim,

he is simply opening himself up to a potential lawsuit for an FDCPA violation." Id.
24. 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016).
25. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). This decision is outside
the survey period for this Article.
26. 817 F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2016).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4).
28. De Gazelle Grp., 817 F.3d at 748. The Eleventh Circuit noted that typically, a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a default judgment is reviewed under
"the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v.
Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013)). But the court noted that when a district
court denies a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a default judgment as void for lack of service
of process, the district court's denial is reviewed "de novo, because the district court's failure
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The plaintiff, De Gazelle Group, Inc. (De Gazelle), a Florida corporation, filed a breach of contract action against Tamaz Trading Establishment (Tamaz), a Saudi Arabian company. The plaintiff served Tamaz
with process by sending a summons and complaint by FedEx to Tamaz's
29
post office box in Saudi Arabia, addressed to Tamaz's registered agent.
Tamaz did not file any response, and De Gazelle moved for a default judgment. After the magistrate judge denied De Gazelle's initial motion for
default judgment,30 De Gazelle filed a motion seeking authorization to
31
serve Tamaz with process via FedEx. The magistrate judge determined
that because Tamaz was aware of the lawsuit, it would not be prejudiced
by any irregularities in De Gazelle's method of serving process. Thus, the
magistrate judge granted De Gazelle's request to deliver service of process to Tamaz by FedEx, and found that service had been retroactively
effected on September 21, 2013.32 The district court then entered a final
default judgment against Tamaz, and later denied Tamaz's Rule 60 mo33
tion to vacate the default judgment as void for lack of service.

to vacate a void judgment is per se an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI, LLC v. Dominican Republic, 788 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2015); Oldfield v. Pueblo de Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2009)).
29. Id. at 748-49.
30. The magistrate judge denied De Gazelle's initial motion for default judgment because "(1) De Gazelle had provided no authority for service via Federal Express, (2) the
summons was delivered to an unidentified 'Receptionist/Front Desk' at a post office box,
and (3) service occurred on a Saturday, which was a weekend day in Saudi Arabia." Id. at
749.
31. Id. In its motion, De Gazelle "moved to extend the time for service and moved for
authorization, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3), to serve Tamaz via FedEx." Id. In support
thereof, De Gazelle provided the district court with a print-out of an online inquiry sent by
Tamaz's registered agent to a professional services referral website, which was coincidentally received by De Gazelle's attorney. Id. In this print-out, the inquiry stated, in broken English, as follows: "I have lawsuit against[] me from company in Florida they would
like you to find] out that and raise lawsuit against them compensation for damage please
let me know and the details of fees." Id. In response to the inquiry, De Gazelle's attorney
informed Tamaz's registered agent that because his firm was representing De Gazelle, it
would be a direct conflict of interest to also represent Tamaz, and thus, he would be unable
to represent Tamaz in the lawsuit. Id. at 749-50. De Gazelle's counsel also informed
Tamaz's registered agent that De Gazelle had "filed suit, and [was] in the process of procuring a default final judgment against [Tamaz] in the federal courts of the United States."
Id. at 750 (alterations in original).
32. Id.
33. Id. Once De Gazelle sought to enforce the judgment through the Saudi Arabian
court system, Tamaz filed a motion to vacate the default judgment arguing that "the judgment was void for lack of service of process." Id. The magistrate judge recommended that
Tamaz's motion be denied, explaining that "good service was effected on Defendant and
that [the court] had jurisdiction to enter judgment in this case." Id. (alterations in original).
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Tamaz argued on appeal that De Gazelle had failed to comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3),34 and that the district court erred
in concluding that De Gazelle effected proper service via FedEx prior to
seeking court authorization. 35 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Tamaz,
stating that "[b]efore a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant .. . there must be authorization for service of summons
on the defendant."36 The Court further explained that when De Gazelle
sent the complaint and summons via FedEx to Tamaz on September 21,
"it was not acting pursuant to a court order." 37 The court further found
that the magistrate judge's reliance on Tamaz's registered agent having

The district court thereafter adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied
Tamaz's motion to vacate the default judgment. Id.
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
35. De Gazelle Grp., 817 F.3d at 751. In its response brief, De Gazelle argued that
Tamaz had waived the argument that service via FedEx required prior court approval because Tamaz had not specifically argued that point in the district court. Id. at 750 n.1.
However, the Eleventh Circuit found that "Tamaz indeed argued that De Gazelle's attempt
at service on September 21, 2013, did not comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(f)(3)." Id. The court further noted that
[e]ven to the extent the argument at issue here was not preserved, [the Court]
would exercise [its] discretion to review it, because whether Rule 4(f)(3) requires
prior court authorization is a pure question of law, and [the Court's] failure to
address Tamaz's argument here would result in a miscarriage of justice, namely,
the enforcement of a $2,500,000 default judgment against it, where it was never
served in compliance with Rule 4.
Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360-61 (11th Cir. 1984)).
36. Id. at 750-51 (quoting Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., Ltd., 484 U.S.
97, 104 (1987)). The Eleventh Circuit referenced the Supreme Court's analysis in Omni
Capital regarding the service-of-process requirement as follows:
Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied. Service of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.
Thus, before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there
must be more than notice to the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There must also be a basis for
the defendant's amenability to service of summons. Absent consent, this means
there must be authorization for service of summons on the defendant.
Id. at 749-50 (quoting Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 104, superseded on other grounds by FED.
R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (1993)). Accordingly, "an individual or entity is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless officially notified of the action . . . under a court's authority, by formal
process." Id. at 749 (quoting Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. OPEC, 353 F.3d 916, 925 (11th Cir.
2003)).
37. Id. at 751. The court explained that under "Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h), corporations may
be served outside the United States 'in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an
individual, except personal delivery under (f)(2)(C)(i)."' Id. at 749. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) prescribes the method by which an individual outside the United States can be
served, and does not specifically authorize service by FedEx. Id.
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actual notice of the lawsuit was misplaced, because "notice does not confer personal jurisdiction on a defendant when it has not been served in
accordance with Rule 4."38 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the district court erred in finding that Tamaz was properly served
on September 21, and reversed the order denying Tamaz's motion to vacate the default judgment. 39
C. An Assignee Cannot be Held Liable Under the Truth in Lending Act
for a Servicer's Failureto Provide the Borrower with a Payoff
Balance.
In Evanto v. FederalNational Mortgage Ass'n, 40 the Eleventh Circuit
held, as a matter of first impression, that because a mortgage servicer's
failure to provide a borrower with a requested payoff balance is not a
violation "apparent on the face of the disclosure statement," an assignee
cannot be held liable under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)41 for the
servicer's failure to provide the payoff balance. 42 The plaintiff borrower
(Evanto) filed a lawsuit against the assignee defendant (Fannie Mae) after the loan servicer (Green Tree) purportedly failed to provide Evanto
with his requested payoff balance after foreclosure proceedings were initiated against him. 43 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted Fannie Mae's motion to dismiss Evanto's lawsuit, and Evanto appealed. 44

38. Id. at 751. The court also noted that "De Gazelle did not seek court authorization
to serve Tamaz via Federal Express until the magistrate judge denied its first motion for a
default judgment on the ground that De Gazelle failed to show that service via FedEx was
authorized under Rule 4." Id.
39. Id.
40. 814 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§1601-1667f (2012).
42. Evanto, 814 F.3d at 1297-98.
43. Id. at 1297. Evanto had obtained a home mortgage loan from Amnet Mortgage, Inc.,
which later was assigned to Fannie Mae. Green Tree serviced the mortgage during the relevant time period. Id. When Fannie Mae initiated foreclosure proceedings, Evanto requested a payoff balance from Green Tree, but Green Tree purportedly failed to provide
Evanto with the payoff balance within the time frame required by TILA. Id. As a result,
Evanto sued Fannie Mae for Green Tree's failure to timely provide the payoff balance pursuant to TILA.
44. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Evanto involved two subsections of
TILA-15 U.S.C. § 1639g 45 and § 1641(e)(1). 46 The court held that Evanto
could initiate an action against Fannie Mae, the assignee, for violation of
TILA's requirement that an accurate payoff balance be provided upon a
borrower's request within seven business days of receipt of the request,
if, inter alia, the violation is "apparent on the face of the disclosure statement." 4 7 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Evanto failed to state a
claim against Fannie Mae as the assignee, because the servicer's failure
to provide a payoff balance is not a violation "apparent on the face of the
disclosure statement" in accordance with subsection 1641(e)(1). 48 The
Eleventh Circuit held that a disclosure statement is "a document provided before the extension of credit that sets out the terms of the loan,"
whereas a payoff balance is something that "can be provided only after a
loan has been made and contains the amount yet to be repaid." 49 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[t]here is no way that the failure to
provide a payoff balance can appear on the face of the disclosure statement."50

45. 15 U.S.C. § 1639g (2012) states in pertinent part that "[a] creditor or servicer of a
home loan shall send an accurate payoff balance within a reasonable time, but in no case
more than 7 business days, after the receipt of a written request for such balance from or
on behalf of the borrower."
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(e)(1) (2012) states in pertinent part as follows:
[a]ny civil action against a creditor for a violation of this subchapter . . . with
respect to a consumer credit transaction secured by real property may be maintained against any assignee of such creditor only if(A) the violation for which such action or proceeding is brought is apparent on
the face of the disclosure statement provided in connection with such transaction
pursuant to this subchapter; and
(B) the assignment to the assignee was voluntary.
47. Evanto, 814 F.3d at 1297.
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 1297-98. The court also noted that TILA fails to define the term "disclosure
statement." Id. at 1297. The Eleventh Circuit explained that TILA uses the disclosure statement to "refer to documents provided before the extension of credit[]" which would necessarily exclude the payoff balance. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2012)). Because section 1639g
(which governs payoff requests) does not use the term disclosure statement, the Eleventh
Circuit assumed that the term disclosure statement is used consistently throughout the
statute, especially because "sections 1638 and 1641 connote one particular document by
using a definite article ('the') and a singular noun ('disclosure statement')." Id. (citing
ANToNIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 170 (2012)); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 434, 513 (2004). The court also noted that Black's Law Dictionary defines disclosure statement as a "document containing relevant information that a reasonable person
would find important in making a decision about a transaction or application," and 'loandisclosure statement' as a 'document setting forth the terms and conditions of a loan, including the amount borrowed, the interest rate, repayment methods, and the rights and
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Ultimately the court rejected Evanto's attempts to expand a borrower's
remedies against an assignee to include violations of § 1639g, finding instead that the plain meaning of TILA forecloses Evanto's action. 51
D. The FairDebt Collection PracticesAct Applies to Communications
with Consumers'Attorneys, and Misrepresentationsof Legal
Requirements in the Initial Communication Subjects Debt Collectors
to Liability.
In a case involving three issues of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit in Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A., 52 reversed the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a putative class action alleging violations of the FDCPA.63 In Bishop, the plaintiffs attorney received
a debt collection letter which informed the plaintiff that she had thirty
days to dispute the debt, but the letter neglected to inform her (or her
lawyer) that she must dispute the debt in writing. Apparently, all other
aspects of the debt collection letter complied with the FDCPA. Shortly
after the debtor's attorney received the debt collection letter, the debtor
filed a putative class action against the debt collectors, which were a law
firm and its attorney who signed the letter. The debtor alleged that the
debt collection letter violated § 1692g of the FDCPA by failing to notify
her of the in-writing requirement for a dispute of the debt. She further
alleged that the letter violated § 1692e which prohibited using "false rep54
resentation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt."

The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
56
Procedure 12(b)(6) 55 with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
The three issues of first impression tackled by the Eleventh Circuit
were: (1) whether a debt collection letter sent to the consumer's attorney-rather than directly to the consumer-qualifies as a communication with a consumer so as to trigger § 1692g of the FDCPA, (2) whether
omitting the in-writing requirement in § 1692g amounts to waiver of that
responsibilities of the borrower and the lender."' Id. (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014)).
51. Evanto, 814 F.3d at 1299. The court noted that "[i]t is a well-established principle
of statutory construction that 'when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies."'
Id. The court explains that because its job "is to follow the text even if doing so will supposedly 'undercut a basic objective of the statute,"' Evanto's claims against Fannie Mae must
be dismissed. Id.
52. 817 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2016).
53. Id. at 1270; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), and 1692g.
54. Id. at 1270, 1274 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
56. Bishop, 817 F.3d at 1270.
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requirement by the debt collector, and (3) whether omission of the inwriting requirement states a claim for false, deceptive, or misleading behavior in violation of § 1692e.5 7
On the first question, the Eleventh Circuit decided that a debt collection letter sent to the consumer's attorney does qualify as a communication with the consumer which triggers § 1692g of the FDCPA.5 8 Acknowledging a split of authority between Circuits, with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that communications directed
only to a debtor's attorney are not actionable under the FDCPA,59 and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit holding that
communications directed to a consumer's attorney are actionable under
§ 1692d through § 1692g, 60 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that because
the FDCPA defines "communication" as conveying information about a
debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium, a letter to
a consumer's attorney is an indirect communication that is covered by
the FDCPA.61 The court found further support in § 1692c of the FDCPA
which similarly forbids a debt collector from communicating with a consumer if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney, "unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the
consumer." 62 Thus, the court concluded that by employing the word "direct," the statute distinguishes between direct communication with a consumer, and "indirect" communication with the consumer's attorney. 63
The court further reasoned that finding coverage of debt collection communications with consumers' attorneys furthers two goals of the FDCPA:
"to eliminate abusive debt collection practices" and "to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses."64 According to the opinion, the protections of the FDCPA should not be forfeited by consumers simply because
they have hired counsel to represent them with respect to the debt. 65
Second, on the issue whether omission of the in-writing requirement
from the debt collection letter to the debtor's attorney amounts to a
waiver of that requirement by the debt collector, the court rejected that
argument, finding that the statute is clear that "the debt collector 'shall'

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2007).
Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, LLC, 505 F.3d 769, 773-75 (7th Cir. 2007).
Bishop, 817 F.3d at 1272 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2)).
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2)).
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2)).
Id. at 1273 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e).
Id. (relying on MilIjkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1301-03 (11th

Cir. 2015)).
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notify the consumer of her right to dispute the debt in-writing." 6 The
court determined that nothing in the FDCPA statutory language suggests that debt collectors have any discretion to relax the requirements
of the FDCPA, including the requirement to notify consumers that they
must take the extra step of putting their disputes about the debt in writing before they can claim the more burdensome set of rights defined in §
1692g(a)(4), (a)(5) and (b).6 7
Finally, on the third issue of first impression decided in Bishop,
whether the omission of in-writing from the debt collection letter states
a claim for false, deceptive, or misleading behavior in violation of FDCPA,
the Eleventh Circuit found that it does state a claim and the district court
erred in dismissing the complaint.68 While noting that the question of
whether a particular communication is false or deceptive is a question for
the jury, the question whether a complaint sufficiently alleges facts to
state a claim under the FDCPA is a legal question for the court.6 9 To analyze the issue, the court discussed the appropriate standard to apply in
determining whether the alleged communication was false, deceptive, or
misleading. The court determined that the least sophisticated consumer
standard applies and is "consistent with basic consumer-protection principles."70 The court found that the least sophisticated consumer standard
is to "ensure that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well
as the shrewd."7 1
The debt collectors argued that the court should implement a "competent lawyer" standard when the debt collector communicates with the
consumer's attorney because attorneys, having legal training, are not
"the least sophisticated consumer" and do not need the same protections. 72 The Eleventh Circuit declined. 7 3 Recognizing that a few Circuits
have adopted the more demanding competent lawyer standard, the Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt that standard and found that those Circuits which apply the competent lawyer standard would not apply it in
the Bishop case. 74 The court found that the allegations were of a misrep-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
2010)).
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1274 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir.
Id. at 1274-75 (quoting LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1194).
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1275-76.

1090

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

resentation, that is, namely, a false statement of fact, which nullified applicability of the competent lawyer standard in any case.75 The court
noted that by rejecting the competent lawyer standard on the facts of the
Bishop case, the Eleventh Circuit does not rule it out entirely in different
cases.7 6 The court distinguished between cases of false statements and

cases alleging merely misleading statements.7 7 Concluding that the least
sophisticated consumer would (or could) have been deceived or misled by
the communication at issue in the case, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and reversed and remanded the case to the district court.78 Thus, the Bishop
opinion demonstrates that practitioners, even when dealing with fellow
members of the bar, must proceed very carefully to comply with every
technicality in the FDCPA and other consumer-protection statutes as
though they were dealing directly with the consumer. Regardless of the
merit of the underlying indebtedness or the good faith of the debt collectors in pursuing their clients' legal rights to be paid, the FDCPA continues to create "gotcha" litigation for consumers' lawyers.
E. The Eleventh Circuit Defines the Duties of a Furnisherof Information
Under the FairCredit Reporting Act to Reinvestigate and Verify
Credit Reporting.
The Eleventh Circuit decided another issue of first impression in Hinkle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,79 finding that "reasonableness"
is the appropriate standard in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA)80 in evaluating whether a furnisher of information to consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) has conducted an appropriate investigation into a disputed consumer debt. 81 In Hinkle, Midland Credit acquired two alleged debt accounts from two different debt sellers where
the debtor/obligor was "Terri Hinkle" on one, and "Teri Hinkle" on the
other. When Midland sent a dunning letter to Teri Lynn Hinkle seeking
to resolve one of the debts, Hinkle orally disputed the debt, telling Midland that the account did not belong to her. Thereafter, Midland sent
Hinkle a letter advising her that it was investigating the dispute and

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1277 n.8.
Id.
Id. at 1277.
827 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681w (2012).
Hinkle, 827 F.3d at 1302.
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mentioned that "it would be helpful" if Hinkle could provide any documentation that supported her dispute. 82 Midland then deemed the account permissible for collection because the debtor's dispute was outside
the validation period under the FDCPA, and Midland began reporting
the account to the CRAs as being in collection and flagged the debt as
disputed. 83
Several months later, Hinkle disputed the account with the CRAs
which, in turn, notified Midland that Hinkle denied the account being
hers. Midland then sent Hinkle another letter advising her that she
should provide documentation supporting her dispute, to which Hinkle
replied that she could not provide anything since the account was not
hers. Midland continued to report the debt as in collection. When Hinkle
sued Midland for violations of the FCRA, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Midland on all counts. 84
The primary issue on appeal was an issue of first impression in the
Eleventh Circuit: the scope of the duty to investigate under § 1681s-2(b)
of the FCRA.85 The court found that although the FCRA does not specify
the nature and extent of the investigation that a furnisher must conduct
under § 1681s-2(b), the structure of the statute, including the framework
in § 1681i(a) for CRAs, leads to the conclusion that reasonableness is the
appropriate touchstone for evaluating investigations under § 1681s2(b). 86

The court "emphasize[d] that what constitutes a 'reasonable investigation' will . . . depend[] on the circumstances of the case and whether
the investigation is being conducted by a CRA under § 1681i(a), or a furnisher of information under § 1681s-2(b)."8 7 The court held that the reasonableness of a furnisher's investigation will depend in part on the status of the furnisher (as an original creditor, a collection agency collecting
on behalf of the original creditor, a debt buyer, or a "down-the-line" debt
buyer, such as Midland) and the quality of documentation available to
the furnisher.8 8
The court looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms verification and
investigation-both used in § 1681s-2(b) to require furnishers to either
verify disputed information by means of investigation, or inform the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1298-1300.
1300.
1301.
1302.
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CRAs that the information could not be verified.89 Finding that the definitions of verification and investigation support the conclusion that §
1681s-2(b) requires some degree of careful inquiry by furnishers of information, the court pointed out that a debt buyer with account level documentation or more comprehensive warranties from its predecessor debt
buyer might be in a different position than Midland with no account-level
documentation or comprehensive warranties.9 0
Next, the court held that furnishers of information are presented with
three options for how to handle information about a disputed account under § 1681s-2(b): first, the furnisher can conduct an investigation, verify
the disputed information, and report to the CRAs that the information
has been verified; second, a furnisher can conduct an investigation where
the disputed information is unverifiable, in which case the furnisher can
cease investigation and notify the CRAs that the information cannot be
verified; and the third option is to conduct an investigation and conclude
that the disputed information is inaccurate or incomplete.9 1
Ultimately reversing the summary judgment in Midland's favor, the
Eleventh Circuit found that a reasonable jury could find that Midland
violated § 1681s-2(b) when it reported the accounts as verified without
obtaining sufficient documentation that the debts in fact belonged to Hinkle. 92 The takeaway from the Hinkle opinion is that, in the Eleventh Circuit, consumers who properly and timely dispute their credit reporting
now impose a much greater burden on the furnisher of information to
investigate than was thought to exist previously. A collection agency
working for the original creditor will have less of a burden since the originator presumably will have original, account-level documentation and
other information to more easily verify a debt. Down-the-line debt buyers, such as Midland in the Hinkle case, will likely have much less access
to account-level documentation and other information about the account
and the debtor, requiring a more robust investigation if the furnisher
wishes to continue reporting the account as verified to the CRAs. Unfortunately for debt collectors that wish to report delinquent accounts to the
CRAs, it appears that the prospects for obtaining summary judgment on
the issue of whether the furnisher conducted a reasonable investigation
will be much more difficult unless the Eleventh Circuit draws clearer

89. Id. at 1302-03.
90. Id. at 1303.
91. Id. at 1303-04. The Eleventh Circuit also pointed out that even if this result appears too strict on debt buyers/furnishers of information, the framework of § 1681s-2(b) is
only with respect to credit reporting. Id. at 1304. Nothing in the opinion requires a furnisher
to cease collection efforts on the debt.
92. Id. at 1307.
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lines for exactly what a down-the-line debt buyer must do to verify a
debtor's account and debt balance when it lacks access to account-level
documentation.
F. A District Court Has Authority Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Compel an
American Company To Produce Documents in the Physical
Possessionor Custody of a ForeignAffiliate.
93
In Sergeeva v. Tripleton InternationalLimited, the Eleventh Circuit
held, as a matter of first impression in any Circuit, that under the plain
reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1782,94 a district court is authorized to order an
American company to produce documents over which it has control, even
if the documents are in the physical possession or custody of the Ameri95
can company's foreign affiliates.
This case arose out of a divorce proceeding in Moscow, Russia and the
plaintiff Anna Sergeeva's (Sergeeva) efforts to obtain information relating to her ex-husband's ownership interests in various international companies. 96 When the Husband obstructed Sergeeva's discovery efforts, Sergeeva filed an Ex Parte Application for Judicial Assistance in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782.97 The district court granted the Application and authorized service of a subpoena to Trident Atlanta (the Subpoena) which sought,
(a
among other things, information and documents relating to Tripleton
98
Bahamian affiliate) and other entities related to Trident Atlanta. Trident Atlanta objected to the Subpoena, on various grounds, including

93.
94.
95.
96.

834 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2016).
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1197.
Id. at 1196. Former spouses Mikhail Leopoldovich Dubin (Husband) and Sergeeva

commenced a proceeding in the Hoamvnischesky District Court of Moscow for the division
of marital assets after sixteen years of marriage (the Russian Dispute). Id. In the Russian
Dispute, Sergeeva claimed that the Husband "was concealing and dissipating marital assets through and with the assistance of 'offshore companies' around the world." Id.
97. Id. The Husband purportedly had interests in various companies located around
the world, including Cyprus, Latvia, Switzerland, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), the
Commonwealth of the Bahamas, and the United States of America. Id. Specifically, in the
United States, Sergeeva sought information from defendant Trident Corporate Services,
Inc. (Trident Atlanta) because she believed such discovery would reveal that the Husband
had a beneficial ownership interest in Tripleton International Limited, a Bahamian corporation (Tripleton). Id.
98. Id. at 1197. The Subpoena
(a) referenced Tripleton, and other Bahamian corporations, including Guardian
Nominees (Bahamas) Limited (Guardian Bahamas) and Trident Corporate Services (Bahamas) Limited (Trident Bahamas); (b) referenced other "Trident
Trust" entities located in Cyprus and Switzerland; (c) demanded production of
documents possessed by Trident Trust entities located outside the United
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that it sought documents located outside of the United States and required Trident Atlanta to obtain documents from a third party. 9 Trident
Atlanta filed various motions to quash the subpoena and the court's related orders instructing it to comply with Sergeeva's discovery, all of
which were denied.1 00 Trident Atlanta appealed these orders (the First
Appeal), and requested stays of the district court's discovery orders pending resolution of the First Appeal, which the district court denied.' 0
While the First Appeal was pending, Sergeeva moved for sanctions
against Trident Atlanta for failure to produce documents responsive to
the Subpoena.1 02
The district court granted the Sanctions Motion, ordered Trident Atlanta to produce documents responsive to the Subpoena or pay a coercive
sanction of $500 each day for up to sixty days of continued non-compliance, and awarded Sergeeva her attorneys fees and costs associated with
States, including Trident Bahamas; and (d) instructed Trident Atlanta to furnish all responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control, regardless
of whether such documents or materials are possessed directly by [Trident Atlanta] or by any of [Trident Atlanta's] agents, representatives, attorneys, or their
employees or investigators.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
99. Id.
100. Id. Upon receiving the Subpoena, Trident Atlanta objected on numerous grounds,
including that "[the Subpoena] sought documents located outside the United States and
required Trident Atlanta to obtain documents from a third party." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Trident Atlanta also filed various motions to vacate the district court's order authorizing the service of the Subpoena and quash the Subpoena. Id. Trident Atlanta's motions were referred to the magistrate judge, who "(a) denied the motions; (b) granted [Sergeeva's] motion to compel; and (c) required production of all documents responsive to the
Subpoena that are within the possession, custody, or control of Trident Atlanta ('MJ Production Order)." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The magistrate judge also denied Trident Atlanta's motion for reconsideration of the MJ Production Order (the MJ Reconsideration Order). Id. After the MJ Production Order, Trident Atlanta produced twenty-three
pages of documents from its Atlanta office and objected to the MJ Production Order and the
MJ Reconsideration Order. Id. The district court overruled Trident Atlanta's objections to
the magistrate judge's orders and approved both orders (the DJ Review Order). Id. Months
later, the district court declined to reconsider its DJ Review Order and noted the following
regarding Trident Atlanta's obligation to respond to the Subpoena:
[Trident Atlanta] is required to respond to the [S]ubpoena as ordered by [the
Magistrate Judge] on November 22, 2013. If it does not have the requested documents, it should say so via a discovery response with a clear statement as to
what [Trident Atlanta] has done in order to obtain these documents. If [Trident
Atlanta] cannot produce the documents after a good faith attempt to find documents, it should say so. Obviously, if [Trident Atlanta] does not tell the truth
and does in fact have the practical ability to obtain the documents, this Court
will order sanctions against [Trident Atlanta].
Id. (alteration in original) (the DJ Reconsideration Order).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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03
Trident Atlanta then apthe Sanctions Motion (the Contempt Order).
pealed the district court's Contempt Order, and the Eleventh Circuit con04
solidated Trident Atlanta's appeals.1
On appeal, Trident Atlanta argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 "does not
reach documents located in foreign countries because American courts
were not intended to serve as clearing houses for requests for information
from courts and litigants all over the world (Extraterritoriality Argument)." 05 As a matter of first impression in any Circuit, the court rejected Trident Atlanta's Extraterritoriality Argument based on the plain
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and the broad scope of discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 06 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that, because the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 provides that discovery be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize extraterritorial document productions, § 1782 authorized the district court to require that "Trident Atlanta produce documents in its possession, custody, and control, even if such documents are in the
07
The court
possession of one of the Bahamian Trident Trust companies."

103. Id. at 1197-98.
104. Id. at 1198. Following its Contempt Order, the district court "rejected Trident Atlanta's request for relief from the Coercive Sanction and entered partial final judgment
awarding $234,983.58 to [Sergeeva] as the Compensatory Sanction." Id. After Trident Atlanta filed its appeal of the Contempt Order (the Second Appeal), the Eleventh Circuit consolidated its appeals. Id.
105. Id. at 1199 (internal quotations omitted).
106. Id. at 1199-1200.
107. Id. at 1200 (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit explained that the
district court "properly began its analysis with an examination of the statutory text" and
correctly noted that section 1782 "plainly says that discovery is to be produced pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise limited by court order." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012) states as follows:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order
him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal .... The order may
be made .. . upon the application of any interested person and may direct that
the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced,
before a person appointed by the court ... . To the extent that the order does not
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordancewith the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.
Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1198 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)). The Eleventh Circuit identified
the four "prima facie requirements that must be established before a district court may
exercise its authority under § 1782" (the Prima Facie Requirements) and identified four
additional factors, established by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), that a district court should consider in determining whether
and how to grant an applicant's § 1782 request (the "Intel Factors"). Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at
1199 (citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 255, 260-62).
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further found that "[t]o hold otherwise would categorically restrict the
discretion Congress afforded federal courts to allow discovery under §
1782 in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."108
Next, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Trident Atlanta's argument that
the district court applied the improper standard in requiring Trident Atlanta to produce responsive documents and information located outside
the United States as long as Trident Atlanta had control over the material (the Control Argument).t 09 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the term "control" means a "legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand," and found that control could be established for
purposes of discovery where the "affiliated corporate entities-who claim
to be providers of complimentary and international financial serviceshave actually shared responsive information and documents in the normal course of their business dealings." 110 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit

Trident Atlanta argued that the Eleventh Circuit should consult "the legislative
history and principal drafter" of § 1782 and apply "a presumption that [U.S.] law governs
domestically but does not rule the world." Id. at 1200 (alterations in original). The Eleventh
Circuit "decline[d] to adopt such a provincial view given that the statutory text authorizes
production of documents in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782). The court noted not only that "Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 45 requires that subpoenaed parties produce designated documents,
electronically stored information, or tangible things in [the parties'] possession, custody, or
control," but also that "the only geographical limitation provided by Rule 45 concerns the
location for the act of production-not the location of the documents or information to be
produced." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, "so long as Trident Atlanta had
possession, custody, or control of such responsive material," the district court "could require
that Trident Atlanta produce responsive documents and information located outside the
United States." Id.
108. Id. at 1200 (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that "the location of responsive documents and electronically stored information-to the extent a physical location can be discerned in this digital age-does not
establish a per se bar to discovery under § 1782" because to hold otherwise would be in
direct contrast to the intent of Congress in passing § 1782. Id.
109. Id. at 1200-01. Trident Atlanta argued that "the District Court: (a) applied the
wrong legal standard; and (b) made factual findings in [Sergeeva's] favor without sufficient
record evidence." Id. The Eleventh Circuit applied an "extremely limited and highly deferential standard of review" and rejected Trident Atlanta's arguments. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
110. Id. at 1201 (citing SeaRock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653-54 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Citing its prior analysis in SeaRock, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court
applied the correct legal standard of broadly construing "control" for purposes of discovery
as "the legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand." Id. (quoting SeaRock,
736 F.2d at 653-54). After reviewing the evidence in the record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence seemingly demonstrated, among other things, that (a) Trident Atlanta admitted that Trident Bahamas actually provided the corporate information concerning Tripleton and the Husband's beneficial ownership interest in Tripleton; (b) Trident
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agreed that there was sufficient evidence that Trident Atlanta had control over responsive documents in the physical possession or custody of
Trident Bahamas to require Trident Atlanta to produce those documents
in response to the Subpoena.
In Trident Atlanta's Second Appeal, Trident Atlanta argued that the
Contempt Order was founded on unlawful orders, that the district court
was divested of jurisdiction to issue the Contempt Order, and that the
11
Contempt Order was not supported by evidence. The Eleventh Circuit
rejected Trident Atlanta's arguments and affirmed the district court's
Contempt Order in all respects as to the Second Appeal under the analysis relating to the Extraterritoriality and Control Arguments and the
112
evidence of record.
The holdings in Sergeeva likely make excellent fodder for a circuit
split. It will be of particular interest to see if other circuits tackling this
issue in the § 1782 context will adopt the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning,
as well as whether the Eleventh Circuit might expand these holdings,
and particularly those regarding the control argument and whether a domestic company may be required to produce documents in the physical
possession or custody of a foreign affiliate, in discovery disputes outside
the § 1782 context.

Atlanta and Trident Bahamas are members of the Trident Group which offers clients '"international financial planning services' through 'production' and 'client liaison' companies
around the world"; (c) "production companies in the Trident Group refer client requests to
client liaison companies for communication purposes;" (d) Trident Atlanta is a client liaison
company; and (e) Trident Bahamas is a production company. Id. Based on the evidence, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that client liaison members, like Trident Atlanta, "could not
possibly perform their intended functions for Trident Group clients absent the ability to
obtain information and documents from production company members." Id. Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit found that "significant 'circumstantial evidence' established that Trident Atlanta had 'control' over responsive documents in the physical possession or custody
of Trident Bahamas." Id.
111. Id. at 1201-02.
112. Id. The court rejected Trident Atlanta's argument that the Contempt Order was
founded on "unlawful orders," because "the MJ Production Order and the DJ Review and
Reconsideration Orders were lawful." Id. at 1201. Next, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
"[a]bsent entry of a stay on appeal-which Trident Atlanta failed to obtain here-the District Court retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders" and consider the Sanctions Motion.
Id. at 1201-02. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Trident Atlanta's argument that the
Contempt Order was not supported by evidence because 'Trident Atlanta was afforded ample opportunity to show cause why it should not be held in contempt and sanctioned" and
despite this, the "fulsome record evinced clear and convincing violations of the District
Court's many orders, which violations complemented discovery-avoidance efforts in other
jurisdictions, exerted .. . on behalf of Ex-Husband, Tripleton, Trident Bahamas, and other
members of the Trident Group." Id. at 1202.
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G. The Age Discriminationin Employment Act Does Not Allow an
Unsuccessful Job Applicant to Sue an Employer for a Practice that
has a DisparateImpact on Older Workers.
In Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,113 a divided Eleventh Circuit held, on rehearing en banc, that under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),114 a job applicant cannot sue an employer for
a hiring practice that has a disparate impact on older workers because
job applicants do not have status as an employee." 5 Although there was
no dispute that as a job applicant, the plaintiff Richard Villarreal (Villarreal) could sue for disparatetreatment under § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA,11 the
majority concluded that based on the text of § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA and
the statutory context, Villarreal, a job applicant and not an employee,
had no standing to sue an employer for disparateimpact." 7
This action arose after Villarreal's job applications were rejected by
defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (Reynolds). Villarreal, who
was forty-nine years old at the time he first applied for work with Reynolds, had his applications screened out because they did not comply with
Reynolds' internal hiring guidelines which targeted recent college graduates.11 8 Villarreal filed his complaint in 2012, asserting claims for disparate treatment under § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA and disparate impact under § 4(a)(2).1 19 Upon the defendants' motion, the district court for the

113. 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
115. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961.
116. Section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA prohibits an employer from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to
hire . . . any individual ...
because of such individual's age." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis omitted)).
117. Id. at 970. Section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA prohibits an employer from "limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing] his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age." Id. at 963 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012)
(alterations in original)).
118. Id. at 961. Reynolds's guidelines "described the 'targeted candidate' as someone '23 years out of college' who 'adjusts easily to changes' and instructed the contractor [reviewing the applications] to 'stay away from' applicants 'in sales for 8-10 years."' Id.
119. Id. at 961-62. After Villarreal first applied for work at Reynolds on November 8,
2007, he was never told by Reynolds that his application had been rejected, nor did he follow
up with Reynolds regarding his application. Id. at 961. In April 2010, Villarreal was contacted by lawyers who told him that Reynolds had discriminated against him because of his
age. Id. Villarreal thereafter filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) against Reynolds and the contractors that reviewed Villarreal's applications. Id. In April 2012, the EEOC issued notices of right to sue, and thereafter Villarreal
filed his complaint in the district court. Id. In his complaint, Villarreal also alleged facts to
support equitable tolling of the limitation period that governed his claims. Id. at 962.
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Northern District of Georgia dismissed Villarreal's claim for disparate
impact on the ground that § 4(a)(2) does not provide a cause of action to
job applicants. 120
On appeal, a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA was ambiguous as to whether Villarreal
had standing as a job applicant to pursue a claim for disparate impact,
thereby deferring to the EEOC's interpretation of § 4(a)(2).121 After granting rehearing, en banc, the majority concluded that Villarreal failed to
state a claim for disparate impact under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA because
12 2
The mahe was only a job applicant, and not an employee of Reynolds.
jority explained that based on the plain text of § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, and
primarily the key phrase stating "or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee," protection against discrimination extends only to em123
ployees, not to applicants for employment. The court further explained
that the statutory context of the ADEA confirms that § 4(a)(2) does not
apply to job applicants, noting that because § 4(c)(2) and § 4(a)(1) of the
ADEA expressly reference and protect job applicants in addition to employees,1 24 by excluding any express reference to job applicants from §

120. Id. at 962. The district court dismissed, as untimely, parts of Villarreal's claims
that were based on his initial application in 2007. Id. Villarreal moved for leave to amend
the complaint to allege additional facts relating to the purported equitable tolling of his
claims, but the district court denied Villarreal's request on the ground that the amendment
would be futile. Id. Thereafter, Villarreal moved to dismiss the remaining portions of the
complaint, and the district court dismissed the same with prejudice. Id.
121. Id. The panel also concluded that equitable tolling was appropriate in this case. Id.
122. Id. at 962-63. The majority also held that Villarreal was not entitled to equitable
tolling "because he admit[ed] facts that disprove diligence." Id. The majority's analysis regarding equitable tolling appears on pages 970 through 973. Id. at 970-73.
123. Id. at 963. The majority explained that "[b]y using 'or otherwise' to join the verbs
in this section, Congress made 'depriving or tending to deprive any individual of employment opportunities' a subset of 'adversely affecting the individual's status as an employee"'
and that "section 4(a)(2) protects an individual only if he has a 'status as an employee."' Id.
(internal citations and alterations omitted). The majority rejected Villarreal's reliance on
Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) as a contrary interpretation of the
phrase "or otherwise" to support his argument that § 4(a)(2)'s protections extend to job applicants. Villarreal, 859 F.3d at 964. The majority explained that even though the panel in
Rine interpreted the phrase "or otherwise" to "indicate[] alternatives," the court in Rine
discussed "or" and "otherwise" in isolation and that, as in this case,"[wiords can acquire
different meanings when combined in a phrase, and the phrase 'or otherwise' is different."
Id. (citing Rine, 590 F.3d at 1215). The majority in Villarreal also cited to various dictionaries to confirm that the phrase "status as an employee" in § 4(a)(2), and specifically the
term "as" "connotes a present fact." Id. at 965 (internal citations omitted).
124. Id. at 967. The majority noted that the text of section 4(c)(2) of the ADEA specifically "adds the words 'or as an applicant for employment' to a provision that is otherwise
largely parallel to section 4(a)(2)." Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (2012)). Similarly, section
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4(a)(2) of the ADEA, Congress did not intend for § 4(a)(2) to apply to job
applicants.125
In his concurrence, Judge Jordan agreed with the majority's "ultimate
conclusion that [] Villarreal cannot assert a disparate impact claim
against [] Reynolds," but found that "there [was] another way to read 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), 126 one that would give effect to each word in this provision."1 27 Judge Rosenbaum also concurred with the majority's conclusion that Villarreal lacked standing to assert a disparate impact claim,
explaining that even though the statutory language is clear, the EEOC
(the agency charged with administering the ADEA) had created confusion because it "consistently construed it in a way that conflicts with
what appears [] to be the objectively indisputable meaning of the statutory language." 128 Finally, in sharp contrast to the majority's findings,
Judge Martin's dissent criticized what she found to be the majority's misinterpretation of "the plain text of the ADEA; reject[ion ofJ the interpretation that the governing agencies have used since 1968; and misread[ing
of] the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"
which created disparate impact liability for discriminatory "hiring criteria."129 Judge Martin also found that the majority's holdings made the

Eleventh Circuit "the first court of appeals to hold that [Supreme Court
precedent] does not allow for disparate impact claims by people alleging

4(a)(1) "makes it unlawful for employers 'to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual ...
because of such individual's
age."' Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). "Unlike section 4(a)(1), section 4(a)(2) does not
mention an employer refusing to hire someone. And unlike section 4(a)(2), section 4(a)(1)
says nothing about a 'status as an employee."' Id.
125. Id. at 967-70 (internal citations omitted). The majority distinguished the cases relied upon by Villarreal in what they characterized as his attempt "to circumvent the plain
meaning of the statute." Id. at 968. Further, the majority concluded that because the statutory text is clear, the traditional tools of statutory interpretation did not require the court
to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA. Id. at 970. The majority pointed out
that "Congress did not leave applicants without recourse," noting that job applicants have
a cause of action against employers for disparate treatment. Id.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
127. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 973-75. Judge Jordan explained that "[a]lthough [] Villarreal
would not benefit from my reading of § 623(a)(2), I offer it for the consideration of others
who may be called upon to interpret the statute in the future." Id. at 973.
128. Id. at 975-81.
129. Id. at 981-93. In her dissent, Judge Martin found that "[bloth of the majority's holdings in this case do harm to this court's precedent and to the nation's anti-discrimination
laws." Id.
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discrimination in hiring." 130 Villarreal's petition for certiorari is currently
31
pending in the United States Supreme Court.1

III. CLASS ACTION
A. Where OriginalSubject Matter JurisdictionExists Over State Law
Claims Under CAFA at the Time a Lawsuit is Filed, Federal Courts
Retain OriginalJurisdictionEven if the Class Claims Are
Dismissed Before the Class is Certified.
In Wright Transportation, Inc. v. Pilot Corp.,132 the Eleventh Circuit
held that if the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)133 vests a district court
with original subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiffs state law claims
at the time the action is filed, a subsequent dismissal of the class claims
will not divest the district court of original subject matter jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs remaining state law claims.134
This appeal arose out of a class action lawsuit filed by the plaintiff
Wright Transportation, Inc. (Wright), an Alabama corporation, on behalf
of itself and others that had fuel discount contracts with the "Pilot" defendants.13 5 Wright filed the class action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama, asserting both state and federal law claims, and alleging that the district court had original subject
matter jurisdiction under CAFA, among other grounds.13 6 The district

130. Id. at 981 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)).
131. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), petition for
cert. filed, 85 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2017) (No. 16-971).
132. 841 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2016).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
134. Wright, 841 F.3d at 1272-73.
135. Id. at 1268. The defendants "Pilot Corporation, Pilot Travel Centers LLC, d/b/a Pilot Flying J, and the named employees of each (collectively, 'Pilot') operate the largest chain
of truck stops in the United States." Id at 1267-68. As part of its business, Pilot contracted
with long-haul trucking companies to provide diesel fuel at discounted rates. Id. In 2013,
an FBI investigation uncovered evidence that Pilot engaged in a conspiracy to defraud its
customers by withholding the contracted-for-discounts without the customers' knowledge
or approval. Id. Wright alleged that Pilot "systematically shortchanged some trucking companies with whom Pilot had discount agreements by failing to give them the agreed-upon
benefits." Id. Further, "[t]he lawsuit alleged that Pilot targeted customers whom it considered to be unsophisticated, including small businesses that lacked the resources to easily
discover Pilot's scheme and Latino customers who might face a language barrier." Id.
136. Id. Wright asserted the following claims against Pilot: (1) violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) for racketeering; (2) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) for conspiracy to commit racketeering; (3) breach of contract under state law; (4) deceptive trade practices in violation of
state law; (5) unjust enrichment under state law; (6) fraudulent misrepresentation under
state law; (7) negligent misrepresentation under state law; and (8) suppression of the proper
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court subsequently dismissed all of Wright's claims, except for Wright's
individual state law claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
The district court also dismissed all of Wright's class claims because,
while Wright's case was pending in the Southern District of Alabama, a
rival class action pending in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas (the Arkansas Case) reached a court-approved settlement which Wright agreed would deprive it of standing to
pursue its class claims.137
In addition to Wright's class action lawsuit, there were six separate
suits pending against Pilot by parties who had opted out of the nationwide class settlement approved by the court in the Arkansas Case. 138 At
Pilot's request, Wright's lawsuit and these six lawsuits were consolidated
into a multidistrict-litigation proceeding (MDL) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. 139 The MDL court subsequently discovered new information about Pilot's citizenship that deprived the court of diversity jurisdiction, whereupon the MDL court
remanded Wright's lawsuit back to the district court in Alabama. 140 The

discounts owed to the class members under state law. Id. In its complaint, Wright alleged
federal subject matter jurisdiction was proper over all of its claims for the following four
reasons: "(1) federal-question jurisdiction [exists] under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for the federal
racketeering claims; (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); (3) jurisdiction
under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); and (4) supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1367." Id.
137. Id. at 1268-69. The district court "dismissed both of Wright's federal racketeering
claims as well as its state-law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and suppression of discounts" because of Wright's failure to plead the defendants' conduct with sufficient particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Id. at
1286. The district court also dismissed Wright's claim for deceptive practices because
Wright was not able to satisfy one of the statutory elements. Id. Further, based on the
approval of the settlement in the Arkansas Class Action, the district court also dismissed
Wright's class claims. Id. at 1269. Ultimately, only Wright's individual state law claims for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment survived. Id.
138. Id. The six separate suits against Pilot were pending in five other federal district
courts across the country. Id. The plaintiffs in these six lawsuits asserted claims against
Pilot which were similar to the claims asserted by Wright. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. In July 2015, the MDL court discovered a March 2015 filing by Pilot Travel
Centers LLC in an action filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida, wherein Pilot Travel Centers LLC alleged that one of the members of the LLC
was a citizen of a state that Pilot had not disclosed in the consolidated cases. Id. Upon
discovering this information, the MDL court ordered Pilot to submit a response detailing
the citizenship of each of the Pilot defendants, including the citizenship of each LLC member when applicable. Id. In its submission to the MDL court, Pilot disclosed that one of its
"sub-sub-sub-sub members" was a citizen of Alabama, where Wright was a citizen and
thereby destroying diversity. Id. Pilot urged the MDL court to retain jurisdiction over
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district court thereafter, upon Wright's motion and despite Pilot's opposition, dismissed Wright's remaining state law claims so that Wright
could refile them against Pilot in Alabama state court. 141 Pilot appealed. 142
On appeal, Pilot argued that the district court erred in finding that it
lacked original subject matter jurisdiction over Wright's remaining state
law claims under CAFA, stating that CAFA "conferred original jurisdiction over all of Wright's claims at the time Wright filed them, such that
the jurisdiction could not have divested when the class claims were later
dismissed." 143 Pilot relied on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Vega v. TMobile USA, Inc., 18 where the court held that "a plaintiffs failure to certify a class does not divest the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
under CAFA."14 5 Noting that its reasoning in Vega had been adopted by

Wright's claims, given that Wright had originally asserted its claims under CAFA. Id. Without ruling on jurisdiction under CAFA, the MIDL court remanded the case to the district
court in Alabama. Id.
141. Id. at 1269-70. Wright moved to dismiss its remaining claims against Pilot without
prejudice to allow Wright to refile its claims in Alabama state court. Id. at 1269. Although
Pilot argued that the district court retained original jurisdiction of Wright's claim under
CAFA, or alternatively may retain supplemental jurisdiction over its claims, the district
court rejected Pilot's arguments stating as follows:
The defendants insist that "post-filing events do not divest a court of CAFA jubut it is irrelevant; the dismissal of the CAFA
risdiction." This may be so ...
(and RICO) claims means the Court "has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction," which means its statutorily granted discretion to decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction has been triggered ....
Id. at 1269-70 (internal citation omitted). The district court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wright's remaining state law claims, explaining that "judicial
economy did not support retaining jurisdiction because the case had largely been pending
before the MDL court, leaving the District Court unfamiliar with the merits of the case." Id
at 1270. Also, because the "state court in Alabama was just as convenient for the parties as
the Alabama federal court," the district court "found no compelling [| argument for exercisId. (internal quotations
ing supplemental jurisdiction over Wright's state-law claims .
omitted) (alterations in original).
142. Id.
143. Id. On appeal, Pilot urged the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that "once this original
jurisdiction is conferred under CAFA, it sticks for the entire life of the case, such that it
could not be destroyed by later events like the class settlement in the [Arkansas Class Action]." Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012), district courts have original jurisdiction of
a suit under CAFA where the following three criteria are met: (1) "the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million, as aggregated from the claims of the individual class members;" (2) "the suit must be brought as a 'class action' for a proposed class with at least one[must be] a citizen of a State
hundred members;" and (3) "any member of [the] class ...
different from any defendant." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)) (alterations in original).
144. 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2009).
145. Wright, 841 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Vega, 564 F.3d at 1256). In Vega, the court "reviewed a case in which the District Court modified a proposed nationwide class to be a
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"every circuit to consider this question," 146 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that CAFA jurisdiction is not easily defeated, and that class action
claims asserted under CAFA can only be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
"if those claims contain frivolous attempts to invoke CAFA jurisdiction
or lack the expectation that a class may be eventually certified."1 47 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "[s]uch dismissals, though, mean the federal
court never had CAFA jurisdiction in the first place; they do not mean
that jurisdiction existed and then was lost." 148
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit examined precedent from other
circuits involving both removed cases (upon which Pilot relied in opposing Wright's motion to dismiss) and cases wherein plaintiffs filed complaints in federal court and then voluntarily amended the complaints to
plead away federal jurisdiction. 1 4 9 In the latter instance (which was more
analogous to the case at bar), the Eleventh Circuit explained that courts
must look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction. 150 However, because Wright did not do anything to divest the district court of

Florida-only class and certified it on that basis." Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held
"the District Court abused its discretion in finding the numerosity requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 satisfied because the record contained no Florida-only evidence
of sufficient numerosity." Id. The court explained that "the failure to show numerosity 'does
not divest the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction under [] CAFA,' even though it
gives rise to the possibility that there are fewer than one hundred members of the class."
Id. (quoting Vega, 564 F.3d at 1268 n.12). Ultimately, the court in Vega concluded that
"jurisdictional facts are assessed at the time of removal; and post-removal events (including
non-certification, de-certification, or severance) do not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Vega, 564 F.3d at 1268 n.12).
146. Id. (citing Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Leariet, Inc. 592 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that subject matter jurisdiction is not destroyed when a district court denies
class certification because under CAFA, federal jurisdiction does not depend on certification); Louisiana v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014); In Touch
Concepts, Inc. v. Cellco Pship, 788 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2015)).
147. Id. at 1271-72.
148. Id. at 1271. The Eleventh Circuit compared federal jurisdiction under CAFA to conventional diversity jurisdiction, explaining that conventional diversity jurisdiction "is not
destroyed by post-filing changes to party citizenship, but only by discovery that the parties
were not actually diverse at the time the operative complaint was filed." Id.
149. Id. at 1272. The court explained that "[r]emoval cases present concerns about forum
manipulation that counsel against allowing a plaintiffs post-removal amendments to affect
jurisdiction." Id. (quoting In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir.
2010) (per curiam)). However, "those 'forum-manipulation concerns [] simply do not exist
when it is the plaintiff who chooses a federal forum and then pleads away jurisdiction
through amendment."' Id. (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474
n.6 (2007)).
150. Id. The Eleventh Circuit cited to a Second Circuit case where, in dicta, the court
explained that "if a case were filed originally in federal court under CAFA jurisdiction, the
court would have to dismiss it as soon as the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that
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jurisdiction (instead, Wright's class claims were dismissed because of the
settlement approved in the Arkansas Case),15 1 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "CAFA continues to confer original federal jurisdiction over
the remaining state-law claims in [Wright's] suit" because there was no
allegation that Wright's complaint was deficient under CAFA at the time
its complaint was filed.1 52
IV. CONCLUSION

The 2016 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, several
of which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
While the survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the authors have attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by selecting relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and procedure in
the Eleventh Circuit.

dropped all class-action allegations." Id. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "the reasons
for the hard-and-fast rule that even the plaintiff amending the complaint cannot defeat
CAFA jurisdiction do not necessarily exist for suits originally filed in federal court." Id.
151. Id. As noted by the court, "[t]his case does not require [the Court] to decide whether
a plaintiffs amendments after filing in a federal court can divest that court of CAFA jurisdiction" because the parties in this case did not argue that any action by Wright divested
the federal court of CAFA jurisdiction. Id. Instead, Wright argues that CAFA jurisdiction
was destroyed when the district court dismissed its class claims after the settlement in the
Arkansas Class Action was approved. Id.
152. Id. The court noted that Wright did not argue that the complaint was frivolous or
deficient under CAFA at the time it was filed. Id. Thus, the court explained that "[w]hen
the post-filing action that did away with the class claims is not an amendment to the complaint, [the Court] see[s] no basis for distinguishing cases originally filed in federal court
under CAFA from those removed to federal court," and concluded that CAFA continued to
confer federal subject matter jurisdiction over Wright's remaining state-law claims. Id.
Having reached this conclusion, the court explained that "there was no need for it to analyze
supplemental jurisdiction," especially because "[s]upplemental jurisdiction does have a role
in CAFA cases, but only in those that also have state-law claims that were never subject to
CAFA jurisdiction." Id. at 1272-73 (internal citations omitted). Although the district court
analyzed supplemental jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit found that because neither of the
parties disputed that all of Wright's claims were properly pleaded as CAFA claims originally, "the District Court had original jurisdiction over all eight claims, and that jurisdiction continues to survive even after later events meant there would be no class." Id.

